Marshal the Power of Utilities
July 30, 2026
By Shelley Welton
This essay is part of Building Up in 2029: How to Make Green Statecraft Durable, which brings together 19 scholars and practitioners exploring what a more durable climate and industrial policy agenda could look like for the next governing opportunity.
With revamped capacity and a renewed sense of purpose, a new administration can and should make public utility law a core tool of green statecraft.
The United States is in a new energy crisis. Ballooning electricity demand—driven largely by data centers but also by manufacturing and electrification—is straining the grid’s affordability and reliability.1 Aggressive and geopolitically incoherent military actions, first in Venezuela and then in Iran, have exacerbated the situation by causing spikes in oil and gas prices. Domestically, this new energy crisis has raised difficult questions for energy regulators, including how to manage surging grid interconnection requests, who should pay for new infrastructure, and whether regional electricity markets’ designs can accommodate the pressures they face.
What does all of this mean for climate change? The answer is complex and underdetermined: Swelling electricity demand has increased plans to build new gas-fired generation,2 but gas turbine shortages and rising gas prices make renewable energy appear an ever more affordable choice.3 In another give-and-take, Congress’s repeal of solar and wind energy tax incentives and the Trump administration’s antipathy to renewable energy render their project financing more precarious, but fossil fuel price surges and data centers’ need for near-term power could bolster demand for renewables and energy storage.
It is thus a critical time to reevaluate the tools we have to manage the electricity system—most centrally, public utility regulation. Decisions made by public utility regulators regarding how to respond to today’s energy crisis will shape the future of the US electricity grid for decades to come. If we manage it poorly, we may lock in fossil fuel infrastructure in ways that make planetary climate stability ever more elusive. But if we manage it well, this piece argues, public utility law presents a potent yet underappreciated avenue for accelerating climate progress. Given shared jurisdiction over electricity in the United States, a collaborative effort to reorient federal and state regulation will be necessary to transform the field.
The American Model of Public Utility Law
The US electricity sector has long been regulated predominantly through public utility law, which emerged in the late 1800s as a distinctly American answer to the question of how to regulate large infrastructure monopolies.4 Since that time, this body of law has sought to control access to and prices for vital services including energy, water, transportation, and telecommunications through commission regulation of state-sanctioned monopolies’ prices and practices.5 Over its century-plus of existence, the public utility model has faced critiques that it is inefficient, ineffective, and prone to capture.6 In the latter part of the 20th century, these critiques resulted in substantial deregulation of certain sectors, including transportation, fossil fuels, and telecommunications.7
However, for electricity—a vital good that requires second-by-second balancing of supply and demand—deregulation proved elusive.8 Although the deregulatory era prompted the integration of market constructs into the electricity sector, the public utility regulatory framework has remained basically unchanged. Federal and state commissions still oversee the rates and practices of utilities: The federal government ensures that transmission planning processes and wholesale electricity markets produce “just and reasonable” outcomes, and the state commissions ensure that retail rates and planning and payments for the distribution system remain “just and reasonable.”9
How to Redeem Public Utility Law
What does this public utility model have to do with green statecraft? Although utilities are occasionally addressed as an impediment to the clean energy transition,10 more often the literature on industrial policy and political economy sidelines public utility law. These fields give substantial attention to modes of derisking, coercive regulation, and ownership models, but little to the generative possibilities of public utility regulation.11 This inattention is likely due in large part to a century of accretive—and often quite fair—critiques of the model.12
Yet in a moment of sectoral pressure and the need for significant infrastructural transformation, public utility holds considerable untapped potential. As energy law scholar William Boyd has argued, public utility at its core is “a collective project aimed at harnessing the power of private enterprise and directing it toward public ends.”13 How to direct this power toward new public ends like climate change is a central question worth interrogating.
Planning in Public Utilities
Three functions of public utility law give it potential as a tool of climate progress. First, the systematic coordination needed for the electricity grid makes planning central to the public utility model. At the federal level, regulators oversee regional planning processes for building and paying for new transmission infrastructure and managing “queues” for resources that want to interconnect to the grid.14 Concurrently, states often engage in “integrated resource planning” to determine the right mix of generation resources to build to meet anticipated future demand.15
Scholars and policy analysts have critiqued current regional and state planning processes for failing to produce socially optimal outcomes, as plans often reflect biases for fossil resources and local transmission investments grounded in incumbent utility preferences.16 But revamped planning processes and enhanced regulatory scrutiny could transform utility-sector planning into a potent climate tool. Indeed, studies have found that good transmission planning alone could save consumers billions of dollars while significantly accelerating clean energy deployment.17
A priority federal planning reform should be to establish a National Grid Planning Authority charged with selecting a suite of interregional and large regional transmission lines to anchor the US grid’s expansion in clean and affordable directions. While legislation establishing such an authority would be the cleanest and most robust path forward, existing public utility legal frameworks also offer federal regulators the ability to exert far more control over the shape of federal grid planning.18
Derisking Public Utilities
Second, public utility is not only a planning tool but also a muscular derisking tool. When regulators approve utilities’ planned additions to the grid, these investments gain a presumption of prudence. This presumption, in turn, guarantees the utility the ability to recover its expenditures plus an established rate of return from customers, absent later negligent behavior by the utility.19
The reason that Georgia, a traditionally regulated state, built the only new nuclear power plant in the United States this century has everything to do with this guaranteed cost recovery: The utility made it clear that it would not construct the plant without legislation enshrining a supercharged version of the presumption of prudence into law.20 The results of Georgia’s experiment—a projected $14 billion plant that ultimately ballooned to $36 billion—suggest that staking ratepayer money to fund new infrastructure must be done with caution, so as not to overburden captive customers with long-term costs.21
Nevertheless, public utility is able to stimulate investment where markets often cannot. This ability could be deployed to great benefit to launch promising technologies to address climate change. For example, at the federal level, regulators could revamp efforts to offer enhanced rates of return on priority investments such as long-distance transmission lines and transmission optimization infrastructure. At the state level, regulators could incentivize both experimental central-scale technologies like advanced nuclear and geothermal and more dispersed technologies, including distributed storage and virtual power plants. Federal tax incentives and loan guarantees could again help steer states toward certain preferred categories of investments by rendering the economics of certain technologies more favorable, just as they helped spur Georgia’s nuclear investment.22 These strategies—if deployed thoughtfully and with appropriate oversight—could help marshal additional green finance outside the tax base.
Managing Energy Affordability
Third and finally, public utility law holds potential as a tool for managing affordability through the clean energy transition because of its ability to control and allocate costs. Recent attention has focused on how utilities under public utility regulation are earning outsize profits on their investments—but bold regulators can equally use the model to rein these in.23 Federal and state regulators have approval authority over utilities’ capital structures and can bring down the costs of infrastructure financing through tools including greater debt-to-equity ratios, lowered returns on equity (especially for nonpreferred projects), and the use of public financing authorities.24
Public utility law can also address the concern that data centers are causing significant price increases for residential electricity users and thereby slowing electrification.25 Coordinated federal and state rate structure reforms are critical to ensure that data centers and other large users pay for the costs they put on the grid, as well as help respond to the reliability strain they create.26 Indeed, if planned and managed well, data center–induced demand growth could actually cause residential ratepayers’ portion of infrastructure costs to fall in the coming years, as the costs of the grid are spread over a wider pool.
Conclusion
Public utility law has a set of core characteristics that could be revamped into a potent strategy for achieving an affordable, just, and faster clean energy transition. Public utility tools could help federal and state regulators plan a better system, secure commitments from utilities to build priority resources, and balance energy transition costs among system users. One critical first step in this direction will be to ensure adequate federal and state commission capacity, capable of scrutinizing utility filings and independently analyzing key information, to drive forward creative solutions and push back against incumbents that would stand in the way of climate progress. With revamped capacity and a renewed sense of purpose, a new administration can and should make public utility law a core tool of green statecraft.
Footnotes
- See Claire Brown, “Data Centers and Your Power Bill,” New York Times, February 19, 2026, https://nytimes.com/2026/02/19/climate/data-centers-power-bills.html. ↩︎
- See “U.S. Power Demand Surge from Data Centers Could Lift Fossil Fuel Generation, EIA Says,” Reuters, March 12, 2026. ↩︎
- See Aaron Larson, “Gas Turbine Supply Chain Bottlenecks Could Reshape the Generation Mix in 2030 and Beyond,” Power, January 15, 2026. ↩︎
- See William J. Novak, New Democracy: The Creation of the Modern American State (Harvard University Press, 2022), 113–127; Morgan Ricks et al., Networks, Platforms, & Utilities: Law & Policy (Columbia Law School Faculty Books, 2022); Joshua C. Macey and Brian Richardson, “The Public Law of Public Utilities,” Yale Journal on Regulation 42, no. 179 (2025). In other countries, nationalized industries were typically the early norm, and when many of these were privatized in the later 20th century, they often were handed over to only a few firms, making their administration different from the distinctly plural, decentralized US system. SeePaul Joskow, “Lessons Learned from Electricity Market Liberalization,” Energy Journal 29, no. 9 (2008). ↩︎
- See William Boyd, “Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future,” UCLA Law Review 61 (2014). ↩︎
- See, for example, William J. Hausman and John L. Neufeld, “The Market for Capital and the Origins of State Regulation of Electric Utilities in the United States,” Journal of Economic History 62, no. 4 (2002): 1050–73; Stephen G. Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform (Harvard University Press, 1982); George J. Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2, no. 1 (1971); Richard A. Posner, “Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation,” Stanford Law Review 21 (1969); Harold Demsetz, “Why Regulate Utilities?,” Journal of Law and Economics 11 (1968); George J. Stigler and Claire Friedland, “What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity,” Journal of Law and Economics 5 (1962); Horace M. Gray, “The Passing of the Public Utility Concept,” Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics 16 (1940); William E. Mosher et al., Electrical Utilities: The Crisis in Public Control (Harper and Brothers, 1929). ↩︎
- See Joseph D. Kearney and Thomas W. Merrill, “The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law,” Columbia Law Review 98 (1998). ↩︎
- David B. Spence, “Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?,” Cornell Law Review 93 (2008). ↩︎
- Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824. ↩︎
- See Joel B. Eisen and Heather E. Payne, “Utilities with Purpose,” Florida Law Review 76 (2024);Leah Cardamore Stokes, Short Circuiting Policy: Interest Groups and the Battle over Clean Energy and Climate Policy in the American States (Oxford University Press, 2020); Shelley Welton, “Rethinking Grid Governance for the Climate Change Era,” California Law Review 109 (2021). ↩︎
- See, for example, Daniela Gabor, “The European Union’s Derisking State,” Review of International Political Economy 52 (2025); Leah Downey and Mark Blyth, “Macrofinance and the Green Transformation: Nudging, Attracting, and Coercing Capital Towards Decarbonization,” Review of International Political Economy 32 (2025); Brett Christophers, The Price Is Wrong: Why Capitalism Won’t Save the Planet (Verso, 2024). ↩︎
- See, e.g., sources cited supra note 6. ↩︎
- Boyd, “Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future,” 1619. See also K. Sabeel Rahman, “Infrastructural Regulation and the New Utilities,” Yale Journal on Regulation 35 (2018), which traces the origins of the “public utility tradition” back to concerns of access and fairness. ↩︎
- See Joshua Macey and Elias van Emmerick, “Towards a National Transmission Planning Authority,” Harvard Environmental Law Review 49 (2025). ↩︎
- See Bruce Biewald et al., Best Practices in Integrated Resource Planning: A Guide for Planners Developing the Electricity Resource Mix of the Future (Synapse Energy Economics and Berkeley Lab, November 2024, revised December 2024), https://emp.lbl.gov/publications/best-practices-integrated-resource. ↩︎
- SeeCatherineHausman, “Power Flows: Transmission Lines, Allocative Efficiency, and Corporate Profits,” American Economic Review 115 (2005). ↩︎
- SeePatrick R. Brown and Audun Botterud, “The Value of Inter-Regional Coordination and Transmission in Decarbonizing the US Electricity System,” Joule 5 (2021); Alexander E. MacDonald et al., “Future Cost-Competitive Electricity Systems and Their Impact on US CO2 Emissions,” Nature Climate Change 6 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2921. ↩︎
- Shelley Welton, Toward a National Grid Planning Authority (Hamilton Project, Brookings Institution, May 2024), https://hamiltonproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/20240522_THP_Climate_GridGovernance_Proposal.pdf; Macey and van Emmerick, “Towards a National Transmission Planning Authority”; Will Gorman et al., “Grid Connection Barriers to Renewable Energy Deployment in the United States,” Joule 9 (2025). ↩︎
- Megan Wachspress, “Dear Prudence: The Atomic Origins, Decarbonization Deployment, and Transformative Potential of a Regulatory Principle,” forthcoming in Utah Law Review (2026), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6308639. ↩︎
- See Shelley Welton and Conor Harrison, “Lessons in Climate Derisking: The United States’ Failed Nuclear Renaissance,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 173 (2025). ↩︎
- Aneil Kovvali and Joshua C. Macey, “Private Profits and Public Business,” Texas Law Review 103 (2025). ↩︎
- Welton and Harrison, “Lessons in Climate Derisking.” ↩︎
- Mark Ellis, Rate of Return Equals Cost of Capital: A Simple, Fair Formula to Stop Investor-Owned Utilities from Overcharging the Public (American Economic Liberties Project, January 2025), https://www.economicliberties.us/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/20250102-aelp-ror-v5.pdf; Daniel Tait, Shelby Green, and Sue Sturgis, Paying for Their Profits: How Ratepayers Foot the Bill for Soaring Utility Profits (Energy & Policy Institute, March 2026), https://energyandpolicy.org/utility-profit-report/. ↩︎
- Good examples of such innovations exist in state transmission authorities, as well as in efforts by the Biden administration’s Transmission Facilitation Program. SeeMaeve Allsup, “The Rise of the State Transmission Authority,” Latitude Media, May 15, 2026, https://www.latitudemedia.com/news/the-rise-of-the-state-transmission-authority/; “Transmission Facilitation Program,” US Department of Energy, https://www.energy.gov/oe/transmission-facilitation-program. ↩︎
- See Monitoring Analytics, 2025 State of the Market Report for PJM: Volume II (Monitoring Analytics, 2025). ↩︎
- More specifically, certain proposals suggest that data centers that do not supply their own generation could be required to provide some flexibility services to the grid, accepting curtailment of power in reliability crises before system-wide responses are triggered. See, for example, PJM, Powering Reliability through Market Design (PJM, May 6, 2026), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/library/reports-notices/special-reports/2026/20260506-powering-reliability-through-market-design.pdf. ↩︎
AUTHOR

Shelley Welton is presidential distinguished professor of law and energy policy at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School and the Kleinman Center for Energy Policy. She teaches environmental law, energy law, climate change law, and a seminar on networks, platforms, and utilities. Her scholarship focuses on how climate change is transforming energy governance within the United States and transnationally.