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President Obama is going big on capital taxation in the State of the Union tonight, including a proposal to raise dividend taxes on the rich to 28 percent. The President is probably not going to frame this as a move away from the George W. Bush economy, but Bush’s radical cuts to capital taxes are part of his legacy that we are still living with. And it’s a part that the latest evidence tells us did a lot to help the rich without helping the overall economy at all.

In the response to Obama’s proposal, you are going to hear a lot about how lower dividend rates increase investment and help the real economy. Indeed, lowering capital tax rates has been a consistent goal of conservatives. As a result, one of the biggest capital taxation changes in history happened in 2003, when George W. Bush reduced the dividend tax rate from 38.6 percent to 15 percent as part of his rapid and expansive tax cut agenda.

There’s been a lot of research about the effect of this massive dividend tax cut on payouts to shareholders (kicked off by an important 2005 Chetty-Saez paper), but very little on its effect on the real economy. Did slashing the dividend tax rate boost corporate investments, perhaps because it made funding projects easier? We don’t know, and it’s not because economists aren’t interested; it’s because it’s very difficult to construct a control group with which to compare the results. Investments increased after 2003, but they likely would have to some degree independent of the dividend tax cut, as we were coming out of a recession. So did the tax cut make a difference?

This is where UC Berkeley economist Danny Yagan’s fantastic new paper, “Capital Tax Reform and the Real Economy: The Effects of the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut,” (pdf, slides) comes in. He uses a large amount of IRS data on corporate tax returns to compare S-corporations with C-corporations. Without getting deep into tax law, C-corporations are publicly-traded firms, while S-corporations are closely held ones without institutional investors. But they are largely comparable in the range Yagan looks at (between $1 million and $1 billion dollars in size), as they are competing in the same industries and locations.

Crucially, though, S-corporations don’t pay a dividend tax and thus didn’t benefit from the big 2003 dividend tax cut, while C-corporations do pay them and did benefit. So that allows Yagan to set up S-corporations as a control group and see what the effect of the massive dividend tax cut on C-corporations has been. Here’s what he finds:

The blue line is the C-corporations, which should diverge from the red-line if the dividend tax cut caused a real change. But there’s no statistical difference between the two paths at all. (Note how their paths are the same before the cut, so it’s a real trend in the business cycle.) There’s no difference in either investment or adjusted net investment. There’s also no difference when it comes to employee compensation. The firms that got a massive capital tax cut did not make any different choices about things that boost the real economy. This is true across a crazy-robust number of controls, measures, and coding of outliers.

The one thing that does increase for C-corporations, of course, is the disgorgement of cash to shareholders. Cutting dividend taxes leads to an increase in dividends and share buybacks. This shows that these corporations are in fact making decisions in response to the tax cut; they just happen to be decisions that benefit, well, probably not you. If right now you are worried that too much cash is leaving firms to benefit a handful of investors while the real economy stagnates, suddenly Clinton-era levels of dividend taxation don’t look so bad.

This is interesting for people interested more specifically in corporate finance theory. Because this is evidence against the theory that firms use the stock market to raise funding, and toward a “pecking order” theory that internal funds and riskless debt are far above equity in a hierarchy of corporate funding choices. In models like the latter, taxation of dividends does very little to impact the cost of capital for firms, because equity isn’t the binding constraint on marginal investment options.

President Obama will likely focus his pitch for the dividend tax increase on the future, when, in his argument, globalization and technology will cause compensation to stagnate while investor payouts skyrocket and the economy becomes more focused on the top 1 percent. But it’s worth noting that while capital taxes are a solution to that problem, the radical slashing conservatives have brought to them are also partly responsible for our current malaise.

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Taxpayers are subsidizing ever-larger executive pay packages while their own wages stagnate. For the middle class to prosper, that needs to change. The intrepid economic proposals in Rep. Chris Van Hollen’s action plan “to grow the paychecks of all, not just the wealth of a few” may not win over a Republican Congress, but they

Click here to subscribe to Roosevelt First, our Monday through Friday morning email featuring the Daily Digest. New Study Shows Who Wins if Oakland Hikes Minimum Wage (San Francisco Business Times) Eric Young reports on a study coauthored by Roosevelt Institute Fellow Annette Bernhardt, which shows 48,000 workers could benefit if Oakland approves a $12.25

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Executive compensation is soaring while workers and taxpayers feel the squeeze. A new Roosevelt Institute white paper explains why. Americans hate the fact that CEOs of big corporations keep raking in millions while the incomes of most American households are sinking. Now a new Roosevelt Institute white paper by University of Massachusetts economist William Lazonick

Income inequality will continue to rise unless we close the performance pay loophole and curb the growth of executive compensation. For more, see “Fixing a Hole: How the Tax Code for Executive Pay Distorts Economic Incentives and Burdens Taxpayers,” by Susan Holmberg and Lydia Austin. It’s proxy season again, and we will soon be deluged with

A new report from the Rediscovering Government Initiative lays out 15 ways the government can create more and better jobs starting right now. After five long years, the economy has at last produced enough new jobs to compensate for the 8 million lost in the Great Recession of 2009. But in that same period some

Roosevelt Institute President and CEO Felicia Wong spoke yesterday at the Income Inequality Symposium in Seattle, where she gave the closing remarks, calling on our memories of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal to urge Seattle into action on raising the minimum wage. Her prepared remarks are below. Thank you so much, Mayor

A model of corporate governance that brings in employees and other stakeholders alongside shareholders could ensure corporations make decisions based on more than stock prices. At this point, saying that inequality in the United States is a problem is almost cliché. There is plenty of data illustrating the extent of inequality. Proposed solutions range from

Wall Street has responded well to Summers’s withdrawal, but Main Street would also be better off without an inflation hawk leading the Federal Reserve. The stock and bond markets should not be the only ones rejoicing at Larry Summers’s withdrawal from consideration to run the Federal Reserve. The nation’s workers should, too. Janet Yellen, the

Let’s say you were trying to make a personal budget. We can imagine two reasonable ideas you would want to incorporate into this budget. The first is that you want to make sure you can pay your bills if your income suddenly freezes up or you suddenly need cash. You want to make sure your savings are sufficiently liquid in case there is an emergency.

Another rule is that you want your time horizon of your debts to match what you are buying with those debts. You don’t want a 4-year mortgage and a 30-year auto loan; you want a 4-year auto loan and a 30-year mortgage. And for our purposes, you really don’t want to buy either on a credit card, since the payment terms can fluctuate so often in the short term.

These two ideas are behind two of the additional special forms of capital requirements designed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in Basel III. The first is a “Liquidity Coverage Ratio” (LCR), which is designed to make sure that a financial firm has sufficiently liquid resources to survive a crisis where financial liquidity has dried up for 30 days. The second is a “Net Stable Funding Ratio,” which is designed to complement the first rule and seeks to incentivize banks to use funds with more stable debts featuring long-term horizons.

Basel has just introduced some changes into their final LCR rule, so let’s take a deep dive into this capital requirement rule. Before we introduce some headache-inducing acronyms, remember that the basics are simple here. Banks have a store of assets and they have obligations that they have to make. Or, at the simplest level, banks have a pile of money or things that can be turned into money and people and firms who are demanding money. So any watering down of the rule has to impact one of those two things.

Remember that in a crisis it is hard to sell assets to get the cash you need to make your payments. Also, crucially, others will want to take out more from the bank if they are worried about the bank’s assets, like in a bank run. So both of these items are stressed in the rule to get numbers sufficient to survive a crisis. Banks would prefer to count riskier kinds of things as those safe assets, and assume that firms would want to take less in times of crisis. Each allows them to have to hold less high-quality capital.

There are three major changes announced. The first is that the requirements will be slowly phased in each year for the next several years, fully online by 2019. This is to avoid putting additional credit stresses on the financial system right now. There’s also a clarification that assets can be drawn down in times of crisis. But how will these regulations look when they are online? The other two changes are the way the actual mechanisms are calculated.

Let’s chart out those last two changes that were just introduced:

Originally there were just two levels of assets, level 1 and level 2. The second change is to create a new level of assets, called “Level 2B.” Level 1 is unchanged, as well as the old Level 2, which is now Level 2A. Level 2B will be no more than 15 percent of total assets, but it will include lower rated corporate debt (BBB- or above) and, more shockingly, equity shares. Equity is not what you want as a liquidity buffer, as its value will plummet and volatility will skyrocket during crises. In a crisis all correlations go to 1, and that’s especially true in a financial crisis. The fact that it might have done well in the 2008 crisis is no excuse because, as Economics of Contempt pointed out on this topic, there were massive government bailouts and interventions in the market, which is what we want to avoid.

On the plus side, rather than just putting equities in “Level 2,” they created a separate bucket with harsher penalties. Equities will receive a 50 percent haircut toward qualifying, much larger than the 15 percent haircut Level 2A assets get.

The third change is the lower outflow rate for liquidity facilities, corporate deposits as well as other sources of outflows. To get a sense of this, stable deposits with a serious system of deposit insurance – think of your FDIC savings account – originally had a 5 percent outflow. A bank would have to be prepared for 5 percent of its deposits to leave during this financial crisis. That has been reduced to 3 percent in the new rule.

These changes are particularly large for liquidity facilities. Instead of the assumption that firms will go gunning for any emergency liquidity that they can find, and as such use up most of these outlines, there are much more financial-friendly outflow estimates. In fact, many of these rates have been cut by more than half, with Basel now estimating that liquidity facilities, for instance, will only be drawn down 30 percent instead of 100 percent.

These are dramatic reductions. If they are predicated on more closely aligning with 2008 numbers, backstopping the entire liquidity of the financial markets was the whole point of the bailouts and the Federal Reserve’s emergency interventions. The numbers should be much worse in this case.

There is finally a global rule declaring a necessary, but not sufficient, minimum level of liquidity in financial firms. Liquidity does nothing if a firm is insolvent, but it by itself can generate panics. However these rule changes almost all entirely benefit the financial system, and call for less liquidity than in the first drafts. Undercounting the liquidity facilities, as well as letting more of the HQLA consist of assets like stocks and MBS, is a major change from the previous version.

The Basel committee notes that its Liquidity Coverage Ratio is an absolute minimum rate, and that “national authorities may require higher minimum levels of liquidity.” Authorities within the United States should take this seriously. Dodd-Frank calls on regulators to put in sufficient liquidity regulations for large financial firms. Basel III provides a baseline, but regulators could go further by themselves if necessary via their Dodd-Frank mandate. Understanding why the outflow assumptions have so dramatically changed will be one point to follow.

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